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Dealing with Uncertainty: The Use of  Risk Analysis
7.1. Introduction
The previous chapter emphasized the uncertainty that is inherent in project 
analysis that is based on CV benefit estimates. The range in uncertainty in 
these benefit estimates creates a difficult issue for the analyst; how to deal with 
uncertainty in a cost-benefit framework. This chapter explains how to take 
the uncertainty fully into account in economic cost-benefit analysis by using a 
Monte Carlo risk approach. It examines the issue of  uncertainty in the context 
of  the case study for the Tietê River cleanup project introduced in Chapter 
2 and analyzed in Chapter 6. It builds upon the original economic analysis 
performed and uses the Monte Carlo technique to simulate the economic 
results of  the project and analyze its risks.
The chapter analyzes the uncertainty both with respect to measures of  
willingness to pay and with respect to other estimates used in the calculation 
of  feasibility (e.g., project costs, the timing of  the energy benefits, execution 
period, shadow prices, and future political decisions that affect use of  project 
outputs). It concludes that the analysis of  risk provides the decision maker 
with important information about the possible consequences of  his or her 
decision and the degree of  confidence one can have in making it. It also 
concludes that the conventional sensitivity analysis commonly provided 
in many cost-benefit analyses is a poor substitute for risk analysis and can 
sometimes be misleading. 
The chapter begins with an introduction to quantitative risk analysis. In then 
presents the problem addressed in the case study. At the time of  analysis of  
the second stage of  the project, the first stage had already been completed and 
for that reason the analysis concentrates mainly on the economic feasibility 
of  the works yet to be built (an incremental project). The uncertainties about 
the factors that potentially determine the project’s outcome and how they are 
captured in the risk analysis are explained. Finally, the results and conclusions 
of  the risk analysis are contrasted with those produced by a conventional 
sensitivity analysis, and conclusions are drawn. 
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7.2. Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA): An Introduction
Analysts involved in project analysis should take into consideration the uncertainty 
involved in the values used in estimating input and output quantities and prices. 
Risk analysis is a key feature of  modern decision making, for both government 
and industry and it is defined as the process of  quantitatively and qualitatively 
assessing risks (Galway 2004). The future is uncertain and so are many of  the 
variables in any model. We cannot know with certainty what the future holds or 
what the true value of  a variable is, but we need to be able to make informed, 
realistic decisions in the face of  uncertainty. If  we only take into account the best 
estimate values of  the input variables of  a model we may be taking more risk 
than we intend (Pouliquen 1970). Quantitative risk analysis149 provides us with 
the means to understand and manage the risks inherent in an uncertain world 
(Vose 1996). Vose (2008) states that “the objective of  a QRA is to calculate 
the combined impact of  the uncertainty in the model’s parameters in order to 
determine an uncertainty distribution of  the possible model outcomes.” (pp. 4). 
QRA accounts for every possible value that each variable could take and weights 
each possible scenario by the probability of  its occurrence. Risk is defined as the 
probability of  occurrence of  an undesirable outcome (Evans and Olson 1998).
There are three types of  risk analysis150: a) subjective estimation of  probability, b) 
sensitivity analysis, and c) probability analysis (Sang 1988).
7.2.1. Subjective Estimation of  Probability
In subjective151 estimation of  probability, the shape of  the probability distribution 
is arbitrarily assigned by the expert. This is particularly used by cost analysts 
when attempting to analyze the risks of  new and untried technologies (although 
we will demonstrate the use of  subjective distributions in the analysis). In 
most cases, the analyst taps the resources of  expert judgment and subjective 
probability distributions to quantify cost uncertainty (Galway 2007). This process 
is known as elicitation and has been widely study in the field of  decision analysis, 
psychology, and economics and can be subject of  numerous biases. 
149 There is a rich literature on quantitative risk analysis. For a comprehensive guide to the topic see Vose 
(2008 and 1996), Aven and Vinnem (2007), Ayyub (2003), ADB (2002), Bedford and Crooke (2001), Morgan 
and Henrion (1992). Melnick et al. (Editors) (2008) provide a large compilation of  examples of  risk analysis 
in many areas.
150 When we refer to risk analysis we are also referring to uncertainty analysis. Since with risk analysis you 
are assigning probability distributions to parameters of  input variables you are also taking into account the 
uncertainties surrounding those values. Therefore, when discussing risk analysis we are also discussing uncer-
tainty analysis.
151 The term subjective is derived because these distributions represent the personal opinion of  an expert. 
An objective probability distribution would be determined from measurements on a physical system.
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7.2.2. Sensitivity Analysis
The purpose of  sensitivity analysis is to determine how sensitivity the net 
present value (NPV) of  a project or internal rate of  return (IRR) is to changes 
in the most crucial input variables. The technique is to deterministically 
modify the values of  the input variables one at a time by making an up/
down adjustment (e.g. 10%, 20%) and calculate the effect on the indicator of  
interest152. This type of  analysis is useful to assess the significance of  the most 
relevant input variables in the parameter of  interest of  the project and should 
always be considered (HM Treasury 2003). A lack of  sensitivity analysis is 
considered as evidence of  poor quality study (Walker and Fox-Rushby 2001). 
Once the variables that affect the NPV are identified, a probability analysis 
can be carried out where the input variables are limited to those identified 
during the sensitivity analysis. 
Unfortunately, sensitivity analysis does not provide any information on the 
statistical dispersion of  the NPV’s (Sang 1988). Furthermore, in this type 
of  “what-if ” scenarios, three values for each variable are usually presented 
(minimum, best guess, and maximum) when, in fact, variables could take any 
number of  values. Also, sensitivity analysis assumes that the variables are 
all independent of  one another (i.e. no correlation). In complex and large 
projects the analyst may be presented with a very large number of  variables; the 
assumption of  independence may produce nonsensical results (Campbell and 
Brown 2003). Although sensitivity analysis incorporates some of  the uncertainty 
in the input variables it is not adequate in very sensitive or complex projects, such 
as environmental quality improvement or natural resources management, where 
more uncertainty about outcomes is likely to be present because of  the imprecise 
way we have to measure benefits (CVM) and the randomness of  the natural 
world setting which the project operates on and in. 
7.2.3. Probability Analysis (Monte Carlo Simulation - MCS)
Unlike sensitivity analysis, in probability analysis, a probability of  occurrence, or 
a probability distribution is assigned to each input variable deemed as relevant 
to the project and then, with a mathematical-statistical treatment, arrive at a 
measurement of  the probability of  the parameter of  interest of  the project (e.g. 
net present value (NPV)). Probability is the best-known formalism for quantifying 
uncertainty (Morgan and Henrion 1990). By repeating samples thousands of  
times we obtain a frequency distribution of  NPV which approaches the true 
probability as we increase the number of  trials. 
152 Sensitivity analysis application and results were presented in Chapter 6.
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An important issue when performing MCS is determining the probability 
distributions of  random variables. The probability distributions assigned to each 
input variable can be of  subjective or objective nature. The subjective probability 
distributions are assigned by the expert (Galway 2007). For these cases, empirical 
information is usually not available and the analyst has an expert opinion on 
the distribution of  the variable of  interest. Experts are most commonly asked 
to suggest an interval of  likely outcomes or provide three potential outcomes 
(minimum value, most likely, maximum value) (Stæhr 2006). The objective 
probability distributions are assigned based on available empirical data by fitting 
a distribution to the historical (empirical) data of  the variable. The theoretical 
distribution type may be selected as the most appropriate to fit the data based on 
three main reasons: a) the distribution’s mathematics are an accurate model of  
the uncertainty in the variable being considered, b) the distribution to be fitted 
to the data is well known to fit this type of  variable, and c) the analyst simply 
wants to find the theoretical distribution that best fits the data, whatever this 
distribution function may be (Vose 1996). This last point is nowadays, with the 
existence of  computer software (such as Crystal Ball or Best Fit), very tempting. 
These software automatically attempts to fit the data to an array of  distribution 
types. The distribution parameters that make a distribution type best fit available 
data are, in most software, determined by maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) 
(Vose 1996). The fitted distributions are ranked using one or more fit statistics, 
such as Chi-square, Anderson-Darling, and Komolgorov-Smirnov (see Vose 
1996 for a detailed illustration of  each method). However, we urge the analyst not 
to fully entrust the software and exert judgment when selecting the distribution 
type. The analyst must ensure that the fitted distribution covers the same range 
over which the variable being modeled may extend (Vose 1996). 
Objective probability distributions are often preferable to subjective ones because 
they replace speculative guesswork with variability that has been observed in the 
real world, but of  course, they depend on the quality and availability of  empirical 
data153. In other cases, empirical distributions functions are available and are used 
to assign a subjective distribution function.
Once each input variable takes on a specified probability distribution, the 
computer program will generate a random value from each input variable and 
the NPV is calculated and stored. The process is repeated a large number of  
153 On assigning probability distributions to random variables in risk analysis, Vose (1996, p. 51) observes 
that “The precision of  a risk analysis relies very heavily on the appropriate use of  probability distributions to 
accurately represent the uncertainties of  the problem.” Empirically obtained probability distributions, perhaps 
tempered by some judgment, may provide a more accurate picture than purely subjective distributions in many 
situations but expert judgment is also very valuable in many instances, particularly in the analysis of  large in-
vestments in developing countries, where lack of  data is more of  the norm rather than the exception.
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times (in our case 20,000 iterations) and the results are stored in a frequency 
distribution. The resulting distribution of  the outcome is only an approximation 
to the exact distribution (Morgan and Henrion 1990). The accuracy of  MCS can 
be increased by augmenting the number of  iterations or the number of  trials. 
MCS is built under the principle of  the strong law of  large numbers which, in 
simple terms, says that the larger the sample size the closer their distribution (e.g. 
risk analysis output) to their theoretical distribution (Vose 2008). 
A number of  authors support the use of  risk analysis in project appraisal. 
Clarke and Low (1993, p. 142) conclude that “while sensitivity testing is useful 
to highlight the most critical parameters, risk analysis provides an estimate 
of  project worth variability that is both more realistic and easier to interpret 
that that from the standard sensitivity analysis.” Jenkins (1997, p. 41) in his 
review of  the World Bank’s economic analysis methodology recommends 
that “when possible, a Monte Carlo analysis should be undertaken to assess 
the key variables affecting the riskiness of  the project and to assess the 
probabilities of  the project’s potential for success or failure.” Squire and van 
der Tak (1975, p. 56) recommend that “Risk analysis should be adequately 
appreciated by means of  simple sensitivity analysis. The advantages of  
further study of  certain project features or variables and of  a more flexible 
design to cope better with future uncertainties should be part of  the normal 
process of  project preparation and appraisal.” 
In a handbook prepared by the Asian Development Bank (2002) to incorporate 
risk into the economic analysis of  public investment projects it is mentioned that 
The emphasis and presentation of  any form of  risk analysis in project 
economic analysis observed in practice is usually on demonstrating that risks 
to individual project success have already been identified and mitigated as 
far as possible and within the proposed project design, and that the extent 
of  any remaining risk is both quantified (i.e., known) and it is existence 
is regarded as ‘acceptable’ (i.e., to ADB, borrowing government, project 
beneficiaries, etc.) given the nature of  the particular intervention proposed. 
The risk analysis techniques are thus essentially used to complement 
sensitivity testing in demonstrating project robustness………Therefore, 
although risk analysis (of  whatever particular form) may typically appear at 
the end of  an economic analysis in a typical Report and Recommendations 
of  the President (RRP), it should be noted that, from ADB’s perspective, 
risk analysis is fundamentally a project design tool. It is not simply an 
afterthought to economic analysis. (pp. 7 -8)  
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7.2.4. The Rationale for Probabilistic (or Quantitative) Risk Analysis (Monte Carlo Analysis)
In the terminology of  decision analysis, a decision based on a cost-benefit rule is 
a two-action problem with infinite states of  nature (Pfaffenberger and Patterson 
1987). An investment proposal can be either accepted if  it is expected to yield a 
positive discounted net cash flow above the breakeven point of  net present value 
equal to 0, or rejected if  it does not. Because the many influences on NPV and 
random variables, so is NPV. Therefore, at least conceptually, there are an infinite 
number of  possible net discounted cash flow outcomes from a prospective 
investment, each with its own probability of  occurrence. 
The risk-neutral investment decision rule (Brent 1996; Harberger 1996) is to 
proceed with a capital investment project if  the expected value of  its discounted 
stream of  net benefits, E(NPV), is non-negative. If  the expectation of  discounted 
net benefits is negative, the project proposal is economically infeasible. The 
conceptually correct way to obtain E(NPV) is not through a deterministic 
analysis that inconsistently combines extreme value guesses for some variables 
driving benefits or costs with an assortment of  empirically based measures of  
central tendency (i.e., a mixture of  means, medians, and “most likely” modes) for 
others. Rather, in principle, the “best” estimate of  NPV (in the sense of  being 
unbiased, not “most likely”), is obtained by weighting each possible value of  
every variable that determines NPV by the probability of  its occurrence (Squire 
and van der Tak 1975). That is exactly what probabilistic risk analysis based on 
Monte Carlo simulation does.
In addition to the mean of  NPV, if  we want to talk about risk, we also need 
to ask about spread or dispersion. Risk can be viewed rigorously as either the 
probability of  occurrence of  an undesirable outcome (Evans and Olson 1998) 
or the variance of  the expected value of  NPV (Squire and van der Tak 1975). 
Probability is the best-known formalism for quantifying uncertainty (Morgan and 
Henrion 1990), and probabilistic risk analysis gets a firm handle on it (Sang 1988). 
Alternatively, risk can be defined more loosely by asking whether an undesirable 
outcome (negative NPV) might occur over a range of  circumstances that are 
deemed “plausible” a priori. Although this notion of  risk is computationally 
simple to assess using sensitivity analysis, it is not probabilistic. 
To sum up, risk analysis is not new. Rather, it is a venerable decision analysis 
technique that is enjoying a latter-day revival in both government and the 
private sector. Its initial promise was hampered by computational limitations, 
not conceptual flaws (Pouliquen, 1970; Reutlinger, 1970). With modern 
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software packages like Crystal Ball154 (Decisioneering, Inc. 1998; Hulett 1999), 
Predict! (Risk Decisions), BestFit (Palisade Corporation), @Risk (by Palisade 
Corporation), or Project Risk Analysis (by Katmar Software) and the power of  
the personal computer, a simulation of  tens of  thousands of  trials can be run 
in a few minutes, while in 1970 a small simulation of  1,000 trials took from 3 to 
5 days on a mainframe (Pouliquen 1970). In short a strong case can no longer 
be made against systematically quantifying project risk. The question we need to 
pose is why, then, is this approach not standard practice in public policy? 
One can only speculate, but Johnson (1985, p. 19) clearly states the source of  
the reluctance of  multilateral development banks to use risk analysis: “The 
adoption of  any technique that slows operational performance is bound 
to attract the criticism of  both conservative line staff  and output-oriented 
managers.” Nowadays, a lack of  knowledge and understanding of  the 
method in some echelons of  management may still hinder its application. It 
may also remain true that as Johnson suggests, output-oriented managers in 
lending institutions may be reluctant to learn about the ex ante probability of  
failure of  a proposed project investment if  that information might dampen 
a prospective borrower’s enthusiasm, preferring to focus instead on a single 
(positive) point estimate of  NPV. In a more recent review, ADB (2002), the 
issue of  the limited use of  the method is still raised “The question remains as 
to how and in what circumstances such tools may be advocated as appropriate 
to be applied much more widely.” (pp. 6). 
Irrespective of  the viewpoint of  the lender, borrowers in developing countries 
should be concerned about the consequences of  having too many risky projects 
in the public sector portfolio, especially if  that portfolio is dominated by a small 
number of  megaprojects whose risks and impacts cannot be pooled or spread 
widely across space or population (Squire van der Tak 1975). They, if  no one else, 
should insist on a proper comparison of  all of  the risks associated with proposed 
projects in comparison with other, potentially less risky alternatives. 
154 Currently owned by Oracle.
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7.3. The Specific Issue of  Uncertain Benefits
Wattage et al. (2000) argue persuasively that contingent valuation is the most all-
encompassing way to measure the (largely nonmarket) benefits of  water quality 
improvement investments in order to apply the cost-benefit test. 
There are a number of  plausible techniques for extracting benefit estimates 
from referendum contingent valuation data155. The resulting measures of  central 
tendency span a wide range, and economic theory provides no criterion that can 
be used to unambiguously choose a correct (or best) estimate (Vaughan et al. 
1999). All we have are plausible bounds (Boman et al. 1999). Even if  there were a 
way to find a unique point estimate of  benefit, uncertainties would not disappear 
because, being random variables, each of  the estimates has a statistical confidence 
interval associated with it. In short, subjective and statistical uncertainty always 
exists about the magnitude of  nonmarket benefits, and usually exists for market-
based benefits estimates as well. This uncertainty may or may not affect the 
decision to undertake the project. 
If  a project is economically feasible (or infeasible) irrespective of  the benefit 
estimate used, the decision maker can be confident in undertaking (or rejecting) 
it. For example, if  a project’s NPV is positive using one of  the low estimates 
of  average WTP, it will pass the test with an upper bound estimate as well, and 
can therefore be accepted with a reasonable degree of  confidence. Likewise, if  
a project fails the cost-benefit test using one of  the high estimates of  mean 
WTP, it probably is not a good investment, signaling that changes in designs and 
objectives are needed before any commitment can be made. These are clear and 
fairly safe choices, but unfortunately, many prospective investment projects fall 
in the gray area where the project is feasible using some benefit estimates but 
not others, as when it fails the positive NPV test using a lower bound benefit 
estimates but passes the test when a high benefit estimate is used instead. In these 
common situations a decision maker should be told: (a) the probability that the 
project is feasible, (b) the expected losses if  it turns out badly, and (c) the value 
of  obtaining additional information to clarify the decision. 
155 The direct-revelation approach to CV question design is not discussed here. A nontrivial discrepancy 
between the expected values of  WTP produced via referendum or direct revelation can exist for the same 
problem setting (e.g., Wattage et al, 2000).
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Table 7.1. Water Quality in the Tietê Basin at Minimum Flow at the 
Conclusion of  Each Project Stage



























1998 0 33.49 850,200 0 33.49 850,200
2003 0 23.19 547,800 0 23.19 547,800
2010 1.46 13.64 233,300 1.46 13.64 233,300
Tietê confluence Pinheiros
1998 0 15.22 150,200 0 28.89 777,700
2003 1.33 3.73 20,400 0.43 22.27 563,600
2010 1.14a 3.70a 22,000 1.98a 12.55a 246,900
Pinheiros Pumping Station
1998 0 18.47 156,500 0 32.22 587,300
2003 1.99 7.21 10,500 0.55 16.66 292,800
2010 2.07a 7.20a 10,900 2.18a 11.62a 148,500
Edgard de Souza Dam
1998 0.29a 29.16a 664,000 0.98a 31.95a 651,200
2003 1.34a 22.88a 505,400 2.95a 26.10a 460,500
2010 2.48a 12.65a 216,000 4.01a 13.09a 174,900
Pirapora
1998 2.24 20.6 8,400 4.35 14.27 2,200
2003 2.6 17.59 10,200 4.5 13.41 2,400
2010 3.03 10.97 3,700 4.27 8.35 800
a The two different modes of  operation, to carry away waste and to carry away waste and generate electricity, are 
associated with different flows (volume, depth, velocity, and direction) that result in different dilution and reaeration 
rates. In dual-purpose operation, the velocity of  water is greater at the location indicated, and since the Barueri 
waste treatment plant is located between the confluence of  the Pinheiros and Edgard de Souza dam, there is less 
water to dilute Barueri’s effluent. For this reason, the levels of  both BOD and DO are higher with joint waste and 
hydroelectric operation than they are for waste operation alone.
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7.4. Treatment of  Uncertainty in the Economic Analysis
From the case study introduced in Chapters 2 and 6, we stated that the economic 
analysis of  the works separates the appraisal of  the sewerage connections, 
collection networks, and collectors from the analysis of  the river cleanup 
(interceptors, treatment plants, disposal of  sludge, and industrial pollution 
control). Investments that connect users to the public system and carry the 
wastes out of  local areas have benefits in those areas that are not related to the 
benefits of  cleaning up the river. Thus the connection and collection systems can 
be treated as independent projects156. 
The investment in cleaning up the river will produce benefits only when water 
quality improves enough to affect human behavior. For this reason, from the 
economist’s point of  view, the three stages are interrelated, not independent. All 
are needed to attain any benefits (improvement in water quality that will affect 
human perceptions and behavior). 
For Stage I of  the river cleanup project, no cost-benefit analysis was done, 
presumably because the first stage by itself  would not bring about a change 
in water quality that would generate any perceived benefits. Stage I removed 
25 percent of  organic material of  domestic and industrial origin discharged 
into the Tietê River, and a similar percentage of  other pollutants such as 
inorganic material, toxic compounds, and fecal coliforms. However, despite 
biochemical oxygen demand reductions from a “without project” level of  86 
mg/l to 40 mg/l, the recovery of  dissolved oxygen was insignificant (DO), 
since absolute BOD levels remained well above the 5 mg/l that defines a 
“clean” river. With the first stage, levels of  DO reached between 0.5 and 1.0 
mg/l in some months of  the year in segments just before and after a long 
anaerobic stretch. The only benefit is a minor reduction in odors over a short 
stretch of  the river in those months. Under Stage I, dissolved oxygen does 
not reach levels that support aquatic life. 
156 Connection and collection are closely related to the river cleanup project only if  one considers the cost 
of  the cleanup project as the cost of  mitigation. At the time this project was developed, the need for mitiga-
tion was moot. The receptor body was dead; direct dumping of  additional effluent would not make it deader. 
This poses a paradox for economic analysis. Connection programs usually generate large benefits sufficient to 
cover the cost of  mitigation (i.e., treatment). However, in the initial stages of  sewage collection projects, the 
discharge of  wastes direction into receptor bodies may cause no significant deterioration in water quality and 
connection is not economically justified. Expansions of  sewer collection may finally start to degrade the wa-
ter, but the surplus of  the marginal population (often the poorest) may not be sufficient to cover the cost of  
cleaning up everything. The willingness to pay for cleanup by the whole population may not be sufficient to 
justify the cleanup project, but economists do not use the net benefits from connection to sewer systems car-
ried out in the past to justify the cost of  cleanup once mitigation (environmental quality) becomes an issue.
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Two cost-benefit analyses were carried out: one for the project as a whole 
(Stages I, II, and III) and one for the incremental project (Stages II and 
III) (see Chapter 6). The analysis of  the incremental project is the only 
one relevant to the decision about whether to continue. To analyze the 
incremental project, it is necessary to calculate the NPV for Stages II and 
III together because Stage II by itself  is not sufficient to bring any lasting 
improvement in the quality of  the Tietê. The investment costs and benefits 
of  Stage I are not relevant to the investment decision about Stages II and III 
because the capital costs have already been incurred and cannot be recovered 
(they are sunk costs), and the benefits are insignificant. The decision to 
continue depends only on the avoidable costs and attainable incremental 
benefits of  the incremental project. However, the calculation of  the NPV 
for the whole project is also presented for reasons of  transparency and to 
demonstrate the well-known weakness of  using cost-effectiveness analysis 
to justify a project. 
7.4.1. Project Costs and Shadow Pricing Adjustments
SABESP provided information on the costs (see Table 6.2 in Chapter 6) 
of  the investment in the river cleanup and industrial pollution control 
program for the first and subsequent stages. The costs of  investments 
for the first stage are known with certainty since they have already been 
incurred. The investment costs in the second and third stages are estimates 
and are subject to a margin of  error. Because the works of  the second and 
third stages are similar to those of  the first stage, and because there are no 
major construction risks (such as geological risks when digging tunnels), it 
was assumed that the uncertainty about the estimates was relatively small. 
The cost estimates were assigned a margin of  error of  15 percent in either 
direction under a symmetric triangular probability distribution157. The 
distributional assumption implies that the midpoint estimate is the most 
likely; small variations are more likely than large ones; and the maximum 
possible over- or underrun in costs is 15 percent.
SABESP provided estimates of  the operating costs of  all stages, which it was also 
assigned a symmetric 15 percent margin of  error and a triangular distribution. 
The original economic analysis of  the incremental project (Stages II and III) 
did not charge the operating costs or the industrial compliance costs of  the first 
stage operation against the benefits of  Stages II and III. Rather, these costs were 
157 The use of  a 15 percent margin of  error in either direction (symmetric) is neither necessary nor usual. 
Investment costs are typically underestimated (human optimism bias to influence decision makers). Usually an 
asymmetric distribution is used, with the “best estimate” of  cost placed toward the lower end.
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ignored (treated as sunk) in the analysis of  the incremental project because it 
did not seem realistic to assume that the first stage would be shut down if  the 
incremental project were not built. 
The appropriateness of  omitting the operating costs of  the first stage is open 
to discussion, since the costs are, in principle, avoidable. The treatment plants 
could be shut down and the industries could be allowed to suspend operation 
of  their treatment facilities. While it is possible to argue that it would not 
be politically feasible to admit error and stop these operations, this is not an 
economic argument. Therefore, to maintain consistency with familiar cost-
benefit conventions, this analysis assumes that the first stage operating costs 
are avoidable, not sunk, which means that they must appear in the cost stream 
of  the incremental project.
The investment and operating costs correspond to different types of  
works, including interceptors, treatment plants, and systems to pretreat 
industrial effluents. Some of  the factors that cause actual costs to deviate 
from estimated costs are common to all types of  works (e.g., the price of  
cement or steel), while others differ in their effect across types (e.g., change 
in designs, troubles with a single contractor). Thus, the risks of  variation in 
cost are somewhat, but not perfectly, correlated. The degree of  correlation is 
important in risk analysis simulation. If  categories of  costs (or benefits) are 
perfectly correlated, they all take on extreme values at the same time. This 
tends to increase the variability of  the economic results simulated. If  they are 
uncorrelated, a high value in one cost category often offsets a low value in 
others, and the degree of  variability is dampened or even averages out. It is 
important to take this into account. By lumping all investment and operating 
costs together, the analysis here implicitly assumes that they are perfectly 
correlated. This may overstate the variance of  the results. 
A cost-benefit analysis must take into account all costs necessary to obtain the 
benefits, not just the costs financed for the project. One of  the costs not financed 
by the project is the cost of  industrial compliance with pollution control, which 
involves 1,168 industries in Stage I and 350 in Stages II and III. The analysis of  
the first stage did not include private compliance costs. 
Before the first stage was carried out, CETESB estimated that it would cost an 
average of  R$342,464 per firm to carry out the investment necessary to control 
effluents. In retrospect, it estimates R$171,000 per firm (see Chapter 6 for further 
details). There is little empirical basis for either estimate. 
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The analysis here combines the midpoint of  the range in estimated private 
industrial pollution control investment costs, R$256,848, with the public 
sanitation investment costs discussed previously and uses the same triangular 
distribution and 15 percent variation to reflect uncertainty. Annual operating 
costs for the private pollution control effort are approximated as 10 percent 
of  capital costs. This significantly underestimates the possible variation of  
an important cost158. 
The investment and operating costs of  all works relevant to project benefits 
were subdivided into four categories: traded goods, nontraded goods, skilled 
labor, and unskilled labor. These costs were adjusted to economic opportunity 
costs (shadow priced) using a study done for a prior project. The study estimated 
conversion factors for skilled and unskilled labor of  0.79 and 0.48, respectively. 
The research for the prior study used the reciprocal of  the weighted average 
tariff  to estimate a standard conversion factor of  0.91 for nontraded goods, but 
it did not take into account the impact of  high interest rates (tight monetary 
policy) in maintaining the level of  exchange rate. Therefore, this analysis uses a 
0.91 (the estimate from the other study) as an upper bound estimate, 0.75 as a 
modal (most likely) estimate, and 0.67 as a lower bound for the conversion factor 
for nontradables. The analysis uses a triangular distribution to set the maximum 
variation. The distribution is slightly asymmetric; the mean is 0.78. This implies 
that simulations will generate a value less that 0.78 less than half  of  the time. The 
four shadow price factors are not correlated. 
7.4.2. Project Benefits
There are two principal benefits of  the Tietê project: the public good benefits 
stemming from a reduction in odors and aesthetic blight that was estimated by a 
contingent valuation approach, and the private benefits from increased hydroelectric 
power generation that could be valued through the market for energy159. 
7.4.2.1. Improvements in Water Quality
To calculate total gross project benefits of  better water quality, the average benefit 
per household has to be multiplied by the number of  beneficiary households, 
158 Alternatively, the private compliance costs could have been treated in more detail by using a uniform 
distribution with a range from R$171,000 (CETESB’s ex post estimate) to R$342,000. The uniform distribu-
tion implies much greater uncertainty that the simplification proposed in the analysis.
159 In addition there are other benefits that have not been quantified primarily due to budgetary and time 
constraints; these include increased recreation benefits at Pirapora do Bom Jesus and further downstream, the 
retardation of  saline intrusion in the Cubatão River in the Baixada Santista, and the provision of  a more eco-
nomic source of  potable water for the Baixada.
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distinguishing households that are in districts contiguous to the river from those 
that are not. According to census data, there are 2.46 million households in district 
contiguous to the major tributaries and 1.6 million in noncontiguous districts. 
The present population of  São Paulo is known with certainty, but the rate of  
growth, which affects total benefits, is not. São Paulo is heavily built up and its 
expected population growth rate is low160: 0.75 percent in contiguous districts 
and 1.00 percent in noncontiguous areas. The analysis specified a symmetric 
triangular distribution for each, with possible ranges of  growth of  0.5 to 1.0 
percent for contiguous districts and of  0.75 and 1.25 percent for noncontiguous 
districts. Because the contingent valuation question limited the payment period 
to 10 years starting with the construction period, these benefits were project for 
10 years beginning with the construction of  the second stage161. It is important to 
note that finding a reasonable average measure of  per household benefit is more 
problematic, and ultimately much more important, than specifying the size of  the 
future population in this case.
Chapter 6 provided a detailed discussion of  how an array of  different measures 
of  mean and median water quality benefits could be extracted from a single 
referendum CV exercise. The question to ask in the context of  this study is, 
how one or more of  these measures be used in the cost-benefit analysis of  the 
project? There are two kinds of  uncertainty associated with these measures. 
The first is statistical uncertainty within any given measure since each mean is 
a random variable with its own distribution and standard error162. The second 
is methodological or subjective uncertainty across measures, since none of  
them can be ruled out a priori, with the possible exceptions of  the untruncated 
parametric and bounded probit means. 
The statistical margin of  error can be summarized by a confidence interval 
around the estimates of, say, 99 percent, or roughly ± 2.6 standard errors 
on either side of  the mean. These confidence intervals show a percentage 
variation about the several means of  roughly 75 percent for households 
160 Population growth can be confidently confined to rather narrow bounds because population density in 
the areas of  the city affected by the project is already high and there is not much room left for absorbing ad-
ditional inhabitants.
161 The payment period stipulated in the contingent valuation survey was 10 years. Because the principal 
benefits accrue for 10 years, but operating cost continue past 10 years, the net benefit flow eventually turns 
negative. Just when or how often negative net benefits appear depends partly on the length of  execution de-
lays and the timing of  energy benefits. These complexities mean that over the 30-year analysis period, there 
can be multiple changes in sign in net benefits, so there may be multiple internal rates of  return. For this rea-
son, the analysis calculates only the NPV.
162 Ardila (1993) and Hazilla (1999) explain how to compute the distribution of  expected values using the 
delta method, bootsrapping or numerical approximation assuming asymptotic normality of  the parameter es-
timates that appear in the “function of  interest,” the formula for WTP.
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contiguous to the river and 51 percent for more distant households. The 
second kind of  uncertainty is about which of  the several alternatives means 
to use. The statistical margin of  error is far less that the relative range 
between the low and high estimate obtained with the bounded probit model, 
the range of  mean willingness to pay for those in districts contiguous to 
the river is R$3.49 to R$12.77; the means for those not contiguous to the 
river range from R$1.23 to R$9.67. For those contiguous to the river, the 
percentage variation around the midpoint of  the range (i.e., the ratio of  the 
range to the mid-point) is 114 percent and ascends to 155 percent for those 
not contiguous to the river. 
7.4.2.2. Characterizing Uncertainty about CV Benefits
There is no unambiguously correct way to summarize the range of  estimates 
for the Monte Carlo risk analysis, but there are at least three plausible 
alternatives163. The first is to choose one measure, such as the Turnbull lower 
bound mean, as preferred. The advantage is simplicity and the ability to 
incorporate statistical uncertainty, but the disadvantage is that any subjective 
uncertainty is assumed away. In contrast, a judgmental distribution for the 
mean could be formulated based on the gamut of  possibilities to reflect 
subjective uncertainty about which is the “best” estimate (Galway 2007). 
The disadvantages of  this route are that all of  the alternative measures 
have to be calculated in order to make probabilistic assignments, and that 
statistical uncertainty is difficult to incorporate. The work of  Boman et al. 
(1999) promises the best of  both worlds because the upper and lower bound 
nonparametric means offer a way to span a good part of  the range and 
simultaneously incorporate statistical uncertainty. 
The Subjective Approach. Since the uncertainty with respect to the appropriate 
central tendency measure is much greater that the statistical uncertainty, this 
version of  the risk analysis uses a judgmental (subjective) distribution of  the 
central tendency values shown in Table 6.14 in Chapter 6 plus an additional 
subjective adjustment to allow for error in questionnaire design and the 
timing of  its application. 
163 The bounded probit means are outliers, being more than ten times greater that the next highest esti-
mate. It is unlikely that average willingness to pay is this high. This improbability should be reflected in the 
risk anlaysis. It is also worth noting that the untruncated linear model yields and average willingness to pay 
that is negative. This result is inconsistent with theory since it implies that the population would have to be 
paid in order to acquiesce to the cleaning up of  the river. It is possible that some people might have to be paid 
to accept the project. Certain individuals may believe, for example, that they will be inconvenienced more than 
they are benefited by works of  the project located in their vicinity. The average person, however, should be 
positively affected by the project and should have a non-negative willingness to pay.
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In addition to statistical error and possible error from choosing the wrong 
method to estimate central tendency, there is possible error associated with 
the questionnaire and its implementation. The Tietê questionnaire was not 
absolutely clear that the improved quality would still produce unpleasant 
odors for the river 1 month per year. If  respondents had known this, their 
WTP might have been less. Working in the opposite direction, the survey was 
conducted at a time when Brazil was in deep recession. People were worried 
about keeping their jobs. In more normal times, average WTP might have 
been higher than stated at this moment. To reflect these possibilities, it is 
prudent to keep the ranges wide. 
The subjective analysis characterizes the uncertainty with a histogram. For 
districts contiguous to the river, it establishes a lower range between R$2.00 and 
R$4.00. The lower bound is less that the lowest mean (R$3.49) and incorporates 
the possibility that the respondents might have expressed a lower WTP if  they 
had clearly understood that the project would deliver an odor-free river only 
11 months a year, or if  they had more time to consider the implications of  
the income burden the elicited monthly payments would impose annually. 
The upper bound of  the low range incorporates the lowest estimated mean 
(R$3.49). The analysis here assigns a subjective probability of  30 percent to this 
range of  the histogram.
The second range in the histogram goes from R$4.00 to R$7.00. It was 
assigned the second range a probability of  50 percent. This range includes 
three of  the eight means estimated. The relatively high weight indicates the 
author’s judgment that the true WTP is probably within this range. The third 
bar of  the histogram if  for the range R$7.00 to R$10.00 and has a probability 
of  15 percent. This range includes the three higher estimates of  means that 
were considered possible but less likely. The fourth range runs from R$10.00 
to R$50.00. The statistical analysis produced no estimates in this range, but 
it was considered the range more probable than the alternative of  leaving a 
gap and consigning the entire remainder of  the distribution to the interval 
defined by the bounded probit mean, with appeared unreasonably high. It 
was assigned a probability of  4 percent to this range. It allows for the fact 
that true WTP might be higher than estimated because of  statistical error 
in the means that appear in the earlier range, or because the survey was 
carried out in a recession. The final range is from R$50.00 to R$140.00. This 
includes the extreme measure of  the mean from the bounded probit, which 
was assigned a probability of  1 percent, meaning it is highly unlikely but 
not impossible. A similar procedure was used to characterize the WTP of  
households in districts far from the river. Even though this histograms are 
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subjective in nature, expert judgment was also based on the analysis of  data 
stemming from 18 water investment projects undertaken in a period of  10 
years and for which WTP estimates were obtained. The subjective histograms 
were also built based on this information, by taking into account the ranges 
in WTP estimates across the sample of  projects and the likelihood of  these 
values. Furthermore, the construction of  the histograms for this case study 
takes into account the judgment of  several project economists working on 
similar appraisals in the sector. 
The subjective probability distributions for average WTP are shown in Figures 7.1 
and 7.2. The mean WTP for contiguous households implied by the distribution in 
Figure YY is R$7.09 per month, which is R$1.02 higher than the corresponding 
Turnbull lower bound measure. The average is R$3.76 per household per month 
for noncontiguous distribution in Figure 7.2, which is R$0.75 lower than the 
corresponding Turnbull mean. 
 
The subjective WTP distributions are positively skewed, and this assumption will 
be mirrored in the distribution of  the outcome, NPV. In contrast, the alternative 
assumption of  a lower bound Laspeyres (Turnbull) mean with all variation 
coming from normally distributed random (statistical) error would make the 
outcome distribution of  NPV look more normal.
The Nonparametric Limits Approach. Were it not for the insights of  Boman 
et al. (1999), our treatment of  uncertainty on the side of  public good 
benefits would have to stop here, with two sharply contrasting and ultimately 
unsatisfactory approaches to handle either statistical uncertainty or subjective 
uncertainty, but not both. Fortunately, Boman et al. (1999) have linked the 
choice among benefit measures to economic theory, which opens the door to 
an interpretation that narrows the extent of  subjective uncertainty compared 
with the judgment-based method above, and simultaneously accounts for 
statistical variation around mean WTP. 
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To make the link to welfare theory, suppose the proportions of  “yes” 
responses to a referendum CV survey are plotted against the bids and the 
points connected by interpolation to produce a picture of  the survival 
function164. The acceptance proportions should generally decrease as 
the bid level increases. Interpreting the proportions as the fraction of  
individuals who would be willing to buy a fixed amount of  a public good 
(the “quantity”) if  it were offered at a specific bid price, the survival 
function is analogous to a demand curve (Johansson, 1995). The bid levels 
represent marginal willingness to pay, and average willingness to pay is the 
integral under the survival function (see the derivation in Vaughan et al. 
1999; Vaughan and Rodriguez 2000).
Figure 7.3. Welfare Measures (adapted from Boman et al. 1999)
Panel A of  Figure 7.3, adapted from Boman et al. (1999), shows the demand 
for a public good z, as a function of  its hypothetical price. The price is 
equal to the representative individual’s marginal willingness to pay, MWTP. 
The change in the level of  public good provision is z1-z0. The Laspeyres 
lower bound monetary measure of  welfare improvement, L, is represented 
by the area labeled as I, which is the product of  the quantity change and the 
lower, postchange price, MWTPLB. The Paasche upper bound measure, P, is 
the sum of  Areas I, II, and III, or the product of  the quantity change and 
MWTPUB. The true welfare change is the integral under the demand curve 
between z1 and z0, or Area I plus Area II.
164 The analytical formulas for the nonparametric means in Vaughan and Rodriguez (2000) employ the dis-
tribution function, where the probability of  rejection increases with the bid levels. The acceptance proportion 
at any bid level is just 1 minus the rejection proportion, yielding the survival function plotted in Vaughan et al. 
(1999, Figure 3).
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Adding a linear approximation to the nonlinear demand curve shown in Boman 
et al.’s original graph provides a rationale for Kriström’s nonparametric mean, 
which falls between the Paasche and Laspeyres mean. That is, the true welfare 
measure, T, is approximately equal to L + ½ (P-L) or ½ (L+P) = Area I + ½ (Area 
II + Area III). Panel B of  Figure 7.3 shows the Kriström approximation to the 
true mean gets worse as the true demand curve becomes more convex. At some 
point the approximation error in Kriström’s mean will exceed the approximation 
error of  the lower bound Laspeyres (Turnbull) mean, as it does in Panel B. 
From this analogy it is clear that the upper bound mean should never be used by itself  
as a welfare measure in cost-benefit analysis because it always overstates benefits by 
more than Kriström’s intermediate mean, which will also overstate E(WTP) if  the 
demand curve is convex to the origin. It also tells us that the true mean lies somewhere 
between the Kristöm intermediate mean and the Laspeyres (i.e., Turnbull) lower 
bound. In this sense (unless the demand curve is concave to the origin) the Kriström 
intermediate mean, not the Paasche mean, is the operative upper bound. 
Kristöm´s intermediate mean is probably a reasonable compromise if  a single measure 
is desired, but so is the Turnbull lower bound for analysts who prefer to approximate 
the true mean with a weighted average of the Paasche and Paspeyres means. To do this 
in the Monte Carlo analysis, a weighting factor, қ, is drawn from a uniform distribution 
over the interval of 0.50 to 1.0. The factor is multiplied by the Turnbull mean and added 
to the product of 1 minus the factor times the Paasche mean, where both means are 
randomly drawn from normal distributions with the standard errors specified in Vaughan 
and Rodriguez (2000). So T ≈ қ x L + (1 – қ) x P, where the weighting factor, қ is ≥ 0.5.
This approximation always gives the Paasche mean equal or lesser weight that the 
Laspeyres mean in computing a linear approximation to the true mean, rather that 
the equal weights of  0.5 used by Kristöm. In fact, since the mean of  the uniform 
distribution between 0.5 and 1.0 is 0.75, on average the calculation produces a WTP 
that assigns 75 percent of  the weight to the lower bound Laspeyres (Turnbull) mean 
WTP and 25 percent to the upper bound Paasche mean165. The mean WTP for 
contiguous households implied by the unequally weighted procedure is R$7.75 per 
month, which is R$0.66 higher than the corresponding subjective measure, but R$1.67 
lower than Kristöm’s intermediate mean. The unequally weighted average is R$5.80 
per household per month for the noncontiguous distribution, which is R$2.04 higher 
than the corresponding subjective mean, but R$1.29 lower than Kristöm’s mean. 
165 Rather than drawing from the upper and lower bound means inside the Monte Carlo simulation, an al-
ternative way of  accomplishing a similar result would be to calculate the 75/25 weighted mean and variance 
directly by adapting the calculation of  Kristöm´s mean and variance set out in Vaughan and Rodriguez (2000). 
The standard errors differ between the two approaches.
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7.4.2.3. Reflecting Uncertainty in Benefits from Additional Hydroelectric Generation
As described in Chapter 6, until 1992, half  of  the flow of  the Tietê was 
pumped to Billings Reservoir to generate electricity at the Henry Borden 
power plant. “Transitory provisions” in the state’s 1989 constitution now 
prevent pumping wastewater from the Tietê to Billings Reservoir. With the 
treatment plants of  Stages II and III, the water to be pumped would no 
longer be “wastewater” and the environmental authorities might consider 
the water good enough to pump. Thus the Tietê project may have benefits by 
permitting additional hydroelectric generation.
In is not certain, however, that pumping will be allowed. While it is true that 
the water of  the Tietê will no longer be wastewater, it will not be good water. 
Billings Reservoir is classified as a Class II water body. By regulation, water 
pumped to a Class II body cannot degrade the quality to less than 5 mg/l of  
dissolved oxygen, more than 5 mg/l of  biological oxygen demand, or more 
than 4,000 fecal coliforms per 100 ml. Billings Reservoir is already out of  
compliance with Class II standards at the point where the Tietê/Pinheiros 
water would be injected. Thus, in principle, the only water that could be 
pumped there would be distilled water. 
The water to be pumped from the Pinheiros pumping station will not attain Class 
II quality in either Stage II or III. Billings, however, is a very large reservoir. Its 
present quality ranges from Class IV (where Pinehiros/Tietê water would be 
injected) to Class I in the area where water is released for potable uses in the 
Santos region. The environmental authorities could reclassify sections of  Billings 
to reflect present reality and the fact that the reservoir functions as a natural 
treatment plant. If  the parts of  Billings where the Tietê water would be pumped 
were reclassified, Tietê water could be pumped. It is highly uncertain, however 
whether Billings will be reclassified, if  such pumping will be allowed, when it will 
be allowed, and how much will be allowed. 
The Monte Carlo risk analysis simulates a number of  scenarios that reflect the 
political pressures that might be exerted by various institutions and stakeholders. 
The analysis assigns a subjective probability distribution to various scenarios. It 
assigns a 50 percent probability to the most adverse case: diversion of  Tietê water 
is never permitted. The analysis assumes that there is a 5 percent probability 
that pumping will be possible the year after the second stage is completed, a 10 
percent probability in the fourth year after Stage II is completed, a 17.5 percent 
probability the year after the third stage is completed, and a 17.5 percent chance 
4 years after the third stage is completed. 
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Note that in a risk analysis the time lag (pause) between Stages I and II and 
the length of  the Stage II execution period are not fixed, but instead are drawn 
from probability distributions. The probability that energy benefits will come 
online in a certain number of  years after completion of  either Stage II or Stage 
III is also drawn from a distribution, as noted in the computational steps under 
base case execution timing:
Scenario Draw a Uniform Random Number 
and Choose Scenario if  Range is:
Year Energy Benefit Flows Initiated: 
Base Case Execution
1 0.000 to 0.050 12
2 0.050 to 0.150 15
3 0.150 to 0.325 19
4 0.325 to 0.500 22
5 0.500 to 1.000 Never
The acceptance of  pumping is not the only uncertainty. If  pumping is allowed, 
the benefits from using Tietê/Pinheiros water will depend on the amount of  
energy to be generated and the time of  day when it will be generated. To estimate 
the amount of  additional energy that might be generated, historical date were 
obtained on the amount of  water processed by the Henry Borden power station 
before and after the restriction was imposed on pumping from the Pinheiros/
Tietê. The average difference is equivalent to a continuous flow of  67.0 m3/
sec (Table 6.15 in Chapter 6). This flow resulted from a 50-50 division of  the 
Tietê’s flows. A master plan for the water resources of  the states of  São Paulo 
suggests that a 60-40 division might be possible. If  so, it might be possible to 
pump the equivalent of  a continuous 80 m3/sec to Billings.  The amount that can 
be pumped will be determined after a political negotiation of  stakeholders with 
divergent interests. It is not known with certainty. The Monte Carlo risk analysis 
uses the range in the calculations (67.0 to 80 m3/sec). 
The incremental energy generated is the difference between the energy that can 
be generated at Henry Borden with the pumped water less the energy that could 
be generated with the water on the 10 downstream plants on the Tietê, and the 
energy used in pumping. Henry Borden has a production capacity of  5.654 MW/
m3/sec. Pumping a cubic meter from the Pinheiros/Tietê to Billings reduces 
the net production by 0.314 MW/m3/sec. Thus, Henry Borden’s net gain from 
receiving a cubic meter per second is 5.34 MW/m3/sec. This net gain is also 
reduced by the losses of  the hydroelectric plants on the lower Tietê. 
Table 6.16 in Chapter 6 shows that the production generated by a cubic meter 
passing through at the plants is 2.1336 MW/m3/sec. Thus, the net national gain 
from transferring a cubic meter of  water from the Tietê to Billings is 3.206 MW/
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m3/sec (i.e., 5.3400 minus 2.1336). This converts to 27,084 MWh of  additional 
energy per cubic meter per year. If  the incremental water pumped to Billings is 
between 67 and 80 m3, the incremental energy is in the range of  1,881,665 MWh 
to 2,246,763 MWh per year. 
Because Billings is a very large reservoir with interannual storage, it is 
possible to produce most of  the incremental energy at peak. The plants on 
the lower Tietê have enough storage capacity to guarantee peak operation 
with or without the diversion to Billings. The decrease in power on the 
Tietê will be power offpeak. It is not certain, however, that Borden will 
be allowed to use all the Tietê water during peak hours, because the power 
company may be ordered to increase the amount of  water that is released 
at a constant rate to prevent saline intrusion in another river basin (the 
Cubatão). If  such releases are required, they will be offpeak. The value of  
high-voltage energy during peak demand is between R$37.33 to R$42.69 
per megawatt-hour, depending on whether it is wet or dry season, and the 
value offpeak is between R$25.67 and R$30.20 per megawatt-hour, again 
depending on the season. The economic analysis uses a range of  R$30.20 to 
R$42.69 in its calculations. These values are based on the long run average 
incremental cost of  supply at high voltage. 
The risk analysis presented later combined the information about uncertainty 
with respect to the amount of  energy that would be generated each year and 
its value by multiplying the low extreme of  one by the low extreme of  the 
other (1,881,665 MWh x R$30.20) and the high extreme by the high extreme 
(2,246,763 MWh x R$42.69). It uses a symmetric triangular distribution to 
describe the probability166.   
7.4.4. Project Timing: Delays in Stage II Execution and Phasing
Most economic analysis of  investment loans assume that the length of  time 
between the beginning of  construction and the beginning of  operation and 
initiation of  benefit flows (known as the execution period) is the 4 (or more 
recently, 5) –year period stipulated in the loan contracts. Most analyses do 
not estimate the impact of  slow execution on NPV. Analyses for multistage 
projects assume no phasing delays between the end of  one stage and the 
166 This simplified treatment was adopted in order to accommodate the complexities of  execution timing 
more easily in the spreadsheet design. It implies that the value of  energy and the amount produced are per-
fectly correlated, which they are not. This leads to an overestimate of  the probability of  very high or very low 
energy benefits. Had the risks been specified independently, the distribution of  the estimate of  energy ben-
efits would have been more compact, as high draws from one distribution would have frequently been offset 
by low draws from the other.
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beginning of  another. Omission of  the risk of  delays or pauses gives an 
overly optimistic view of  NPV when net benefits are growing at a rate lower 
than the discount rate (the usual case).
To examine the realism of  the 4-year execution period, data on 17 sanitation 
projects undertaken between 1980 and 1992 in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, 
and Uruguay were reviewed. The frequency distribution displays positive 
skewness, with an average execution period of  5.75 years, a median of  5.5 years 
and a mode of  4.75 years. All exceed the 4-year execution period usually assumed.
The execution period for the first stage of  the Tietê was 6 years (known with 
certainty). The risk analysis draws from the empirical frequency distribution for 
the execution period for Stage II, while holding Stages I and III fixed at the 
6 years actually experienced in Stage I and the 7 years planned for Stage III. 
The probability of  delays is characterized by the empirical histogram with a 61.5 
percent probability of  an execution period of  between 5 and 6 years, a 23.1 
percent probability of  an execution period between 6 and 6.5 years, and a 15.4 
percent chance of  delays between 6.5 and 10 years. 
Phasing delays between the end of  Stage I construction and the start of  
Stage II are only relevant for the economic analysis of  the entire multistage 
program. In the absence of  any hard historical data on phasing delays, the 
analysis assumes that a hiatus of  between 0 and 4 years could occur with equal 
probability (uniform probability distribution) between Stages II and II, while 
allowing Stage III to follow without delay. 
7.4.5. The Results of  the Monte Carlo Risk Analysis
Monte Carlo simulation overcomes the limitations of  sensitivity analysis. It 
produces a probability distribution of  a project’s net return based on either 
empirical or judgmental probability distributions for the factors that determine 
that outcome. It does this by repeatedly computing the economic return, each 
time picking input values from their respective probability distributions, to obtain 
a frequency distribution of  economic returns that is a good approximation of  
the probability distribution of  the outcome (Vose 2008).
Table 7.2 summarizes the variables simulated, the range of  values assumed, and 
the shapes of  the probability distributions used for the risk analysis167. Many of  the 
167 For this exercise, a combination of  Microsoft Excel and Crystal Ball was used. Crystal Ball has the ad-
vantage that it can exploit a spreadsheet’s ability to slide blocks of  benefits and cost flows up and down across 
analysis periods in repeated draws.
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probability distributions are subjective rather than empirical. They reflect a judgment 
as to whether any number within a range is equally likely (a uniform distribution) or 
whether some values are more likely than others (a normal, triangular, or custom 
histogram distribution). The most important judgmental distributions involve the 
timing of  energy generation benefits and the range of  WTP. 
Table 7.2. Assumptions about Input Variables in the Monte Carlo Simulations
Variable Distribution Measures of  Central Ten-
dency and Spread
Remarks
Operating and investment 
cost variation factor
Subjective, triangular Most likely = mean = 1.00
Range = 0.85 to 1.15
Symmetric
Skilled labor shadow price 
factor
Subjective, triangular Most likely = mean = 0.79
Range = 0.75 to 0.84
Asymmetric. 
Unskilled labor shadow price 
factor
Subjective, triangular Most likely = 0.48
Mean = 0.49
Range = 0.45 to 0.55
Asymmetric. 
Nontradables shadow price 
factor
Subjective, triangular Most likely = 0.75
Mean = 0.78
Range = 0.67 to 0.91
Asymmetric. 
Execution period, Stage II Empirical, custom Mean = 6.0 years











WTP/household, near the 
river. Average of  Turnbull and 
Paasche means
Empirical, each normal Mean = R$7.75/month
S.E. = R$1.23
Reflects methodological and 
statistical uncertainty 
WTP/household, far from 
river. Average of  Turnbull and 
Paasche means
Empirical, each normal Mean = R$5.80/month
S.E. = R$0.86
Reflects methodological and 
statistical uncertainty 
WTP/household, near the 
river contiguous














WTP/household, far from 
the river
Subjective  histogram Mean = R$3.76/month
S.E. = R$4.95
















Energy benefit factor Subjective, triangular Mean = 1.0
Range = 0.7 to 1.30
Symmetric. 
Energy scenario Subjective, custom Not applicable; categorical; 
50% chance of  no benefits
Asymmetric. 
Population growth rate, 
contiguous
Subjective, triangular Mean = 0.75% per year
Range = 0.5 to 1.0%
Symmetric. Small range due to 
urban space constraints
Population growth rate, 
noncontiguous 
Subjective, triangular Mean = 1.0% per year
Range = 0.75 to 1.25%
Symmetric. Small range due to 
urban space constraints
205
7.4.5.1. Results of  the Incremental Project (Stages II and III)
Two Monte Carlo analyses were made. One considers the project as a whole 
(Stages I, II, and III); the second considers only the second and third stages. The 
second analysis is relevant for the decision to continue the program, since the 
first stage has already been carried out and its capital costs cannot be recovered. 
For now the analysis concentrates on the results for the analysis of  Stages II and 
III under the alternative assumptions that WTP is distributed following either the 
subjective or weighted bound models. 
NPV under the Subjective WTP Distribution
Figure 7.4 presents the probability distribution of  the NPV calculated for Stages 
II and III based on the subjective distribution of  WTP. The distribution of  the 
NPV outcomes provides the decision maker with a rather different picture from 
that provided by the deterministic calculation with sensitivity analysis. It shows 
an average NPV of  R$4.6 million, which changes the investment decision from 
“no-go” to “go” because it is positive and higher that the deterministic loss of  
R$12.1 million mentioned earlier. 
The expected NPV is higher because the subjective probability distribution for 
WTP allows for the possibility that average willingness to pay is very high (its 
probability distribution is skewed to the right). A few draws of  high WTP values 
pull up the simulated average NPV.
Figure 7.4: Incremental Project NPV under Subjective WTP Distribution
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Table 7.3. Monte Carlo NPV Distribution for the Subjective WTP Assumption












Figure 7.4 indicates that there is more risk than the decision maker would have known 
about had he or she been given a standard sensitivity analysis. All the sensitivity analysis 
said was that if  the project were undertaken, it would incur a loss unless the execution 
period could be shortened by 17 percent or unless energy benefits could come online 
in two-thirds the time originally expected. It consequently advised that project approval 
should be delayed until a new execution timeline could be worked out with the borrower. 
Most decision makers would find it useful to know the amount of  the average loss they 
face if  in fact there is a loss. This loss can be estimated as the probability of  each loss 
times its size) the mathematical expectation of  losses). The decision maker can look at 
the size of  this loss to see if  he or she can afford to take the risk. 
The expected loss, however, has a more sophisticated interpretation and use. The 
expected loss is also the cost of  uncertainty. It reflects the maximum amount of  
money a risk-neutral decision maker should be willing to pay to eliminate all 
uncertainty about the factors that determine the outcome. It is the maximum amount 
because it would be better to face the expected loss than pay more than that to obtain 
additional information to eliminate uncertainty. With information about the expected 
loss in hand, the decision maker can choose to (a) undertake the feasible project but 
risk an expected loss; (b) reject the feasible project, avoid the cost of  uncertainty, but 
face an expected loss arising from the potential gains forgone (called the “cost if  
irrationality”); or (c) collect more information to reduce the cost of  uncertainty. 
Figure 9.4 and Table 7.3 show that although approval need not be delayed, since 
the investment passes the positive NPV test, there is a 73 percent chance that the 
project will register a negative NPV (is not economically feasible) and only a 27 
percent chance it may register a gain. The expected loss that would be incurred 
by making the investment is the average of  the negative NPVs, -R$228.1 million, 
multiplied by the probability of  loss, yielding –R$167.2 million. The average 
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potential gain from the project is huge, R$643.3 million, and when multiplied by 
the probability of  a gain (27 percent), the expected gain of  R$171.8 million slightly 
exceed the expected loss. The difference between average gains and losses, both 
weighted by their respective probabilities of  occurrence, is the overall expected 
NPV of  R$4.6 million. The subjective distribution of  WTPs tells decision makers 
that a loss is three times more likely than a gain, but the average payoff  is also 
about three times higher. However the median payoff  that can be expected with 50 
percent probability is negative (-R$150.1 million) and far below the mean because 
the NPV distribution is skewed to the right. Risk-averse investors might be wary of  
this bargain, even though it has small positive expected overall payoff. 
Distribution of  NPV for the Weighted Average of  the Upper and Lower 
Bound WTP Distributions
The degree of  apparent risk associated with the incremental investment is reduced 
appreciably when the subjective WTP distribution is replaced by a 75-25 weighted 
average of  the Turnbull lower bound and Paasche upper bound distributions of  WTP 
in contrast with Figure 7.4 and Table 7.3, the distribution of  NPV in Figure 7.5 and 
Table 7.4 is more symmetric, which reflects the strong influence that the underlying 
normal distributions of  the expected value of  WTP have on the outcome.
Figure 7.5: Incremental Project NPV under Weighted Nonparametric Bounds 
WTP Distribution 
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Table 7.4. Monte Carlo NPV Distribution for the 
Weighted Average WTP Assumption
Percentile Million 1998 R$
0 -322.6
10   -36.5
20    17.9
30    59.7
40    96.6






The global expected value of  NPV is more sanguine yet at R$136.1 million, 
which is almost 1 standard error away from the critical value of  0. the investment 
no longer looks so borderline because the probability of  a loss is just 16 percent, 
which is almost exactly what would be expected for a normally distributed 
random variable (for the cumulative unit normal distribution, the probability of  
a value of  more than 1 standard error above 0 is 15.87 percent). The average 
loss falls to –R$60.8 million, or only one-fourth of  what was predicted under 
the subjective WTP distribution, so the expected loss that might be suffered by 
making the investment becomes –R$9.9 million rather than –R$167.2 million. 
The average of  the positive NPVs, R$174.3 million, produces an expected gain 
of  R$146.0 million after multiplying by the probability of  a gain of  84 percent. 
Again, the difference between the expected gains and losses (R$146.0 million – 
R$9.9 million) equals the global mean NPV. Even a risk-averse investor would 
probably like these odds.
7.4.5.2. Summing Up
The standard decision rule for cost-benefit analysis is that the government 
should undertake all projects with a non-negative expected NPV. This rule 
is based on the assumption that a government undertakes many projects and 
can afford to look at the overall average result across its investment portfolio, 
knowing that some projects will come out better than average and some 
worse. But when a single project absorbs a large percentage of  the investment 
budget, a large adverse result may prevent undertaking other projects. In 
other words there is a high opportunity cost entailed in the decision-making 
process of  whether to undertake a large infrastructure project or not. There 
may be no chance to let project returns average out. The stages of  the Tietê 
209
constitute a large project both for SABESP and for the city of  São Paulo, so 
it is certainly worth looking at information other than the expected (mean) 
NPV. Just two alternative versions about the worth of  the investment based 
on risk analysis have been presented. Potentially there are several other 
interpretations, which are summarized in Table 7.5. 
Table 7.5. Effect of  Benefit Assumption on Risk Analysis Results for the 
Incremental Project
Central Tendency Measure Downside Risk








of  Losses 
(%)






Operating Costs of  Stage I are Avoidable (are charged to Stages II and III)
Turnbull lower bound ($24.4)   $91.0   ($26.9) 61.6   ($81.3)   ($50.1)
Subjective    $4.6 $822.6 ($150.1) 73.3 ($228.1) ($167.2)
Weighted average $136.1 $134.9 $131.7 16.2   ($60.8)     ($9.9)
Kriström intermediate $298.5 $131.6 $296.0   0.8   ($37.9)     ($0.3)
Operating Costs of  Stage I are Sunk (are not charged to Stages II and III)
Turnbull lower bound $295.5   $87.8 $292.9 Negligible   ($9.9) Negligible
Subjective $324.6 $822.3 $169.2 19.9 ($68.1)  ($13.6)
Weighted average $456.0 $133.3 $451.7   0.0   $0.0    $0.0
Kriström intermediate $618.4 $130.4 $615.5   0.0   $0.0    $0.0
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are negative (losses).
If  one were to argue that operating costs from Stage I should be ignored 
(are sunk), the economic justification for the incremental project is ex-
tremely strong. The mean NPV is over 3 standard deviations above 0 for 
all benefit assumptions except the subjective distribution, which places the 
mean 0.4 standard deviations away from the breakpoint. Even if  Stage I’s 
operating costs are included in the cost stream (are “avoidable”), the in-
cremental investment looks extremely promising if  it is evaluated using 
the intermediate nonparametric distribution of  WTP. It still remains fairly 
promising when a weighted average of  the lower and upper bound distri-
butions of  the expected value of  WTP are used instead168.  A recommen-
dation against going forward with the project can only be made if  the best 
representation of  public goods benefits is taken to be the conservative 
Turnbull lower bound WTP distribution. 
168 To drive the overall expectation for NPV below 0, on average the weight attached to the lower bound 
mean WTP would have to be 0.93 rather than 0.75.
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What initially looked like an unattractive investment under a deterministic analy-
sis that used conservative (low) estimates of  average benefits was transformed 
into an attractive but risky or moderately risky investment when the nuances 
of  benefit uncertainties and random variations in costs and timing were incor-
porated via Monte Carlo risk analysis. This transformation is not trickery, but 
a reflection of  how much (or how little) the analyst knows. There is no unique 
bottom line in this case; it only proves that rigid adherence to a deterministic 
non-negative NPV investment criterion can be simplistic, dogmatic, and often 
times misleading. While no actual cost-benefit analysis would ever report this 
broad spectrum of  alternatives for fear of  needlessly confusing decision mak-
ers, Table 7.5 makes it clear that conclusions about the economic viability of  an 
investment are rarely free of  subjective judgment. Risk analysis forces the full 
disclosure of  those assumptions. 
7.4.5.3. Results of  the Risk Analysis of  the Entire Project (Stages I, II, and III)
As stated before, cost-effectiveness analysis was used to justify going ahead 
with the first stage of  investment, on the unproven assumption that the en-
tire project was economically viable. This decision locked the borrower into 
contractual obligations for operation of  the first-stage facilities of  the project, 
repayment of  the first-stage loan, and continuance of  the pollution control 
program. Now, having made the initial commitment, the best choice is to go 
ahead and complete the program. 
Figure 7.6 and Table 7.6 show that even under the highest of  the plausible ben-
efit estimate, Kriström’s intermediate mean WTP, the entire project is not eco-
nomically feasible. At best, the expected NPV is –R$230 million, and would be 
even lower under more conservative assumptions about benefits. This is an ex-
ample of  the rare extreme case mentioned in the introduction: The project fails 
the deterministic cost-benefit test even under the most favorable set of  assump-
tions. So in hindsight, sophisticated analytical approaches would not have been 
needed to reach the conclusion that the investment should not be made. How-
ever, at the time the first stage was approved, benefit estimates were not avail-
able, so the expected payoff  was unknown.
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Figure 7.6: Entire Project NPV under Kriström’s Nonparametric 
WTP Distribution
Table 7.6. Monte Carlo NPV Distribution for Entire Project under 
Kriström’s Intermediate WTP Assumption










90   -53.2
100  441.7
The probability distribution in Table 7.6 shows that the chance of  losing more 
than R$230 million is about 56 percent. At best, the probability that the entire 
project might have a non-negative NPV is only about 5 percent, so the prob-
ability of  incurring a net discounted loss is greater than 95 percent. The cost 
of  uncertainty (the expected positive NPVs forgone by not making the cor-
rect decision to reject the project) is only R$3.5 million, and the cost of  irra-
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tionality (the expected value of  losses undertaking a project that is predicted 
to be infeasible) is R$233.6 million. 
It is worth asking why there is such a difference between the incremental proj-
ect (Stages II and III) and the project as a whole. First, the cost of  the project 
as a whole includes the investment costs of  Stage I, which (although necessary 
for subsequent stages) had no measurable benefits. These costs weigh heavily 
against the NPV of  the project as a whole, particularly since they occur years 
before any benefits begin to accrue. Second, the risk of  delays between the first 
and second stages affects the net present value of  the project as a whole, but 
not that of  Stages II and III (both costs and benefits of  the incremental proj-
ect are delayed). These two factors have a significant impact on the NPV of  the 
three stages taken together. 
7.5. Concluding Remarks
This chapter demonstrates that any single point estimate of  the net economic 
returns of  a project does not provide a decision maker with much information 
and is likely to be wrong most of  the time. Accompanied by the standard sen-
sitivity analysis (depicted in Chapter 6) that assumes variations that may have 
nothing to do with the true margin of  error, it may mislead the decision maker 
into being confident about a decision that in fact is risky, or into being skeptical 
about a promising investment opportunity. 
While it is true that many of  the probability distributions in the analysis are 
subjective, they at least reflect a focused and explicit judgment by the analyst. 
They may not all be based on empirical facts, but they reflect the information 
at hand. Lack of  empirical information is the norm rather than the exception 
when dealing with large infrastructure projects in developing countries. The 
economic results that come from these probability distributions area also not 
empirical facts, but they are consistent with best judgments of  the analyst and 
open for all to review and question. 
This case study also demonstrates that it is important to carry out cost-ben-
efit analysis of  large infrastructure projects, particularly multi-stage, before 
the first stage is initiated. Least-cost analysis alone is not sufficient. It is true 
that the requisite cost-benefit information about inputs, values, and timing 
for projects with long maturation periods is necessarily imprecise at early 
stages. However, the cost-benefit risk analysis technique provides a method 
for meaningfully summarizing what analysts know about a project and for 
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helping design a cost-effective strategy to reduce this uncertainty, using the 
concept of  the value of  information. 
In the case of  the Tietê, it is possible that decision makers, had they known that 
the expected NPV of  the overall project was negative, would have started the 
project anyway. Economic reasons are not the only reasons for doing things. 
It is, however, also possible that having seen the expected results, the decision 
makers might have changed the sequence of  investments, with better results or 
look for alternative technologies. It is clear that economically it would have been 
better to invest first in connections and collections systems that had high eco-
nomic returns. Having done that, they could have concentrated the investment 
in cleanup in a shorter period and increased the NPV of  the cleanup project, al-
though it probably still would not have had a positive NPV. But reality strikes; 
the complexities and the array of  considerations that must be taken when deter-
mining these large infrastructure investments are complex and many of  them 
interrelated. Let’s not fool ourselves: large, tangible investments are highly vis-
ible and attract the interest of  a large number of  interest groups. The political 
economy surrounding these projects cannot be ignored. 
When millions of  dollars are at stage in water pollution control program in-
vestments, cost-benefit analysis is worth the effort, even though the benefits of  
water quality improvement are hard to specify precisely (Wattage et. al. 2000). 
However, that very uncertainty means that an honest economic appraisal should 
probably include a good risk analysis. This means, going beyond the traditional 
sensitivity analysis towards the incorporation of  quantitative risk analysis tech-
niques. The use of  such techniques entails challenges for the decision maker, 
who will need to be educated in analyzing not absolute results for example of  
an NPV but rather a range presented as a distribution of  NPV and other vari-
ables (costs and benefits). Even though these techniques have been applied, 
the use has not been mainstreamed in many organizations, development banks 
and/or developing countries. Even in developed countries we can see that the 
adoption of  risk analysis as part of  the appraisal instruments is rather new. The 
United States Corps of  Engineers, who implement very large water infrastruc-
ture projects only recently elected the use of  Monte Carlo simulation models as 
key strategy for their analysis (Gravens et al. 2008). Gravens (2008) summarizes 
the Corps decision and remaining challenges:
These models produce outputs that are reflective of  the uncertainty frame-
work in which they are built – the results are in the form of  a distribu-
tion rather than a single point. That is, the answers are not “It will cost 
$50,000,000,” but rather, “Here is the range and distribution of  costs 
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and benefits.” This approach is a huge leap from previous methods, and 
it is not clear that the decision-making framework is ready to deal with 
probabilistic information of  this nature. It is simpler to make decisions 
where there is a single measurable criterion, such as average net benefits. It 
is much more difficult to choose when variability comes into play –this ex-
plicitly introduces the idea of  risk and uncertainty into the decision-mak-
ing process. The Corps has recognized this issue, but there is as yet little 
experience of  real-world decision-making that is informed by the types of  
outputs that the new generation of  models can provide. Is this arena, the 
display of  uncertainty information to decision-makers, and the enabling 
of  decision methods in the framework that require further exploration if  
the state of  the art of  technical analysis is to be reflected in good decisions 
for society. (pp. 22).  
If  this is the recent trend in a highly technical and developed organization such 
as the U.S. Corps of  Engineers, and the challenges are enormous, facing the 
change in the decision-making analysis and process, we can expect the process 
in developing countries and international aid agencies to take very long. These 
conclusions are hardly new (see Jenkins 1997), but unfortunately they seem to 
be easily forgotten precisely at the times when their message means the most. 
